← Back to homepage

ORIE 4360/5360: Algorithms for Democracy

Cornell University · Fall 2026

Logistics

Instructor: Paul Gölz (mail@paulgoelz.de)

TA: Gabriel Morete de Azevedo (gm587@cornell.edu)

Lectures: Mon/Wed 2:55–4:10 p.m.

Location: Bard Hall 140

Office Hours: TBD

Links: Canvas, Ed Discussion

Course Description

This course uses mathematics, algorithms, and optimization to understand and improve democratic decision-making, from familiar institutions to novel ones. Topics will most likely include:

  • Arrow's and Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibilities
  • Domain restrictions
  • Epistemic voting and liquid democracy
  • Multi-winner approval elections and participatory budgeting
  • Cardinal welfarism
  • Implicit utilitarian voting (distortion)
  • Apportionment
  • Power indices
  • Sortition

Technical tools include the axiomatic method, notions of fairness and proportionality, mathematical programming, and social welfare functions.

Resources

Syllabus: PDF (Cornell only)

Prerequisites: Basic probability and algorithms. Mathematical maturity is expected, including following proof sketches in class and writing proofs in homework.

Textbook: The Handbook of Computational Social Choice is the most useful single resource; it is freely downloadable from Cambridge University Press as a password-protected PDF (password: cam1CSC). Much of the course material is recent enough that it only appears in papers; references will be posted with each lecture's slides.

Schedule

Subject to change. Slides will be posted as the semester progresses.

# Date Topic Slides
1 Mon Aug 24 Intro and voting with two alternatives slides
2 Wed Aug 26 The "impossibility" of social choice – Arrow's theorem slides
3 Mon Aug 31 Strategic manipulation slides
4 Wed Sep 02 Voting in one dimension slides
Mon Sep 07 🛠️ Labor Day — no class —
5 Wed Sep 09 Epistemic models for voting slides
6 Mon Sep 14 Epistemic models for voting (Part 2) slides
7 Wed Sep 16 Liquid democracy slides
8 Mon Sep 21 Ranking models beyond voting slides
9 Wed Sep 23 Prelim 1 practice session slides
10 Mon Sep 28 Prelim 1 —
11 Wed Sep 30 Approval voting slides
12 Mon Oct 05 Multi-winner elections slides
13 Wed Oct 07 Proportionality in multi-winner elections slides
Mon Oct 12 🍂 Fall break — no class —
14 Wed Oct 14 Core stability in multi-winner elections (slides on Canvas) —
15 Mon Oct 19 Participatory budgeting slides
16 Wed Oct 21 Utilities and welfare slides
17 Mon Oct 26 Implicit utilitarian voting slides
18 Wed Oct 28 Prelim 2 practice session slides
19 Mon Nov 02 Prelim 2 —
20 Wed Nov 04 Implicit utilitarian voting (Part 2) slides
21 Mon Nov 09 Distortion of ballot formats slides
22 Wed Nov 11 Apportionment in the 19th century slides
23 Mon Nov 16 TBA —
24 Wed Nov 18 TBA —
25 Mon Nov 23 TBA —
Wed Nov 25 🥧 Thanksgiving break — no class —
26 Mon Nov 30 TBA —
27 Wed Dec 02 TBA —
28 Mon Dec 07 TBA —

Grading

Subject to change. Full policies are on the syllabus (Canvas).

ComponentWeight
Problem Sets20%
Prelim 120%
Prelim 220%
Final Exam30%
Participation10%
  • Problem sets are assigned roughly every two weeks. Late submissions are not accepted.
  • You may discuss problem sets with others, but must write up your own solutions, and AI tools are not allowed unless stated otherwise.
  • Two 75-minute in-class prelims plus a cumulative final exam, each closed-book with one handwritten sheet of notes allowed.
  • Participation includes in-class polls (PollEverywhere) and engagement in lecture, office hours, and on Ed.