




# Fair Allocations for Smoothed Utilities

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*Yushi Bai, Uriel Feige, Paul Gözl  
& Ariel Procaccia*

# Fair Item Allocation

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|                                                                                     |  |  |  |  |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   | 5                                                                                 | 5                                                                                   | 0                                                                                   | 4                                                                                   |
|  | 2                                                                                 | 1                                                                                   | 2                                                                                   | 2                                                                                   |
|  | 2                                                                                 | 1                                                                                   | 1                                                                                   | 3                                                                                   |

**Setting:**  
- indivisible goods  
- additive utilities

# Envy Freeness (EF)

|                                                                                     |  |  |  |  |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   | 5                                                                                 | 5                                                                                   | 0                                                                                   | 4                                                                                   |
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# Envy Freeness (EF)



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
## Setting:

- indivisible goods
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 values their own bundle at 2, but values 's bundle at  $1 + 3 = 4$   
 $\Rightarrow$   envies .

# Envy Freeness (EF)

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## Setting:

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- additive utilities

# When Do Envy Free Allocations Exist?

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|   | 0                                                                                   | 0                                                                                   | 10                                                                                  | 0                                                                                   |
|  | 1                                                                                   | 0                                                                                   | 9                                                                                   | 0                                                                                   |

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But they seem to exist “most of the time.”

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But they seem to exist “most of the time.”

How to capture this mathematically?

# Previous Work: i.i.d. Utilities

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$\sim \mathcal{D}$     $\sim \mathcal{D}$     $\sim \mathcal{D}$     $\sim \mathcal{D}$




$\sim \mathcal{D}$     $\sim \mathcal{D}$     $\sim \mathcal{D}$     $\sim \mathcal{D}$



$\sim \mathcal{D}$     $\sim \mathcal{D}$     $\sim \mathcal{D}$     $\sim \mathcal{D}$

# Previous Work: i.i.d. Utilities



$\sim \mathcal{D}$

$\sim \mathcal{D}$

$\sim \mathcal{D}$

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$\sim \mathcal{D}$

$\sim \mathcal{D}$

$\sim \mathcal{D}$

$\sim \mathcal{D}$



$\sim \mathcal{D}$

$\sim \mathcal{D}$

$\sim \mathcal{D}$

$\sim \mathcal{D}$

**Theorem [MS21].** If  $m \in \Omega(n \log n / \log \log n)^*$ , envy-free allocations exist in i.i.d. model with probability  $\rightarrow 1$ .

$n$ : number of agents  
 $m$ : number of items


\* under some assumption on  $\mathcal{D}$

Manurangsi, P. & Suksompong, W. Closing Gaps in Asymptotic Fair Division. *SIAM J. Discrete Math.* 35, 668–706 (2021).

# Limitations of Previous Work

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
i.i.d. values




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
values with structure




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
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
Structure like on the right unlikely in i.i.d. models. If practice looks like right-hand side, limits relevance of i.i.d. results.

# Our Model: Smoothed Analysis

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# Our Model: Smoothed Analysis



1. Start from worst-case  
*base values.*



4

5

0

4



2

4

2

2



2


5

1

3

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4

5

0

4



2

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2



2

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
1

3

1. Start from worst-case  
*base values.*

2. For each entry, flip  
biased coin with  
probability  $p \ll 1$ .


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


1. Start from worst-case *base values*.
2. For each entry, flip biased coin with probability  $p \ll 1$ .
3. Where coin comes up heads, “boost” value by amount  $\sim \mathcal{D}$ .

# Our Model: Smoothed Analysis

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
base utilities



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
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base utilities



random  
boosts  
↓


smoothed  
utilities



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
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base utilities



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with high probability,  
envy-free allocation exists

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
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**Theorem.** If  $m \gg n \log n$  and  $p \gg \log n/m$ , envy-free allocations exist in smoothed model with probability  $\rightarrow 1$ .

$n$ : number of agents  
 $m$ : number of items  
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# Algorithm for Finding EF Allocations w.h.p.

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for  $\rho = 1, 2, 4, \dots, m$ :



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
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- with LP, allocate  $\rho$  fractional items such that

$t = \min_{\text{agents } i \neq j} u_i(A_i) - u_i(A_j)$  is maximized.

$i$ 's utility for own bundle

$i$ 's utility for  $j$ 's bundle




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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


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# Overview of Results

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**Theorem.** If  $m \gg n \log n$  and  $p \gg \log n/m$ , our poly-time algorithm finds envy-free allocations in the smoothed model with probability  $\rightarrow 1$ .

$n$ : number of agents  
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Check out our paper!  
[tinyurl.com/smoothEF](https://tinyurl.com/smoothEF)