

PMMS Allocations Need Not Exist for 3 Agents and Additive Valuations

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Consider the setting of fair division with indivisible goods: Let $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$ denote the set of agents, M a set of m goods, and let each agent $i \in N$ have a value $u_i(\alpha) \geq 0$ for each good $\alpha \in M$. We assume that preferences are additive, which means that an agent i 's valuation for a bundle of goods $B \subseteq M$ is simply $u_i(B) := \sum_{\alpha \in B} u_i(\alpha)$. Our goal is to find an allocation of the goods, i.e., a partition of M into bundles $A_1, \dots, A_n$, each associated with its corresponding agent.

Caragiannis et al. [CKM+19] introduced the fairness axiom of *pairwise maximin share (PMMS)*. One reason to be interested in this axiom is that it is stronger (under mild conditions, for example that all agent-item values are positive) than *envy-freeness up to any good (EFX)*, whose existence is arguably the largest open question in fair division.

Definition 1. An allocation $A_1, \dots, A_n$ satisfies pairwise maximin share (PMMS) if, for any two agents $i \neq j$, it holds that

$$u_i(A_i) \geq \max_{S \subseteq (A_i \cup A_j)} \min(u_i(S), u_i((A_i \cup A_j) \setminus S)).$$

But even whether PMMS allocations always exist for additive preferences has since remained an open question, and was for example mentioned as Open Question 8 by Amanatidis et al. [ABF+24]. In this note, I give a counterexample, showing that PMMS allocations need not exist. That this impossibility only requires $n = 3$ agents contrasts with EFX, which is known to exist for three agents and additive preferences [CGM20].

Indeed, consider the following fair division instance with $n = 3$ agents and $m = 9$ goods $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_9$, with additive preferences, which has no PMMS allocation:

agent i	$u_i(\alpha_1)$	$u_i(\alpha_2)$	$u_i(\alpha_3)$	$u_i(\alpha_4)$	$u_i(\alpha_5)$	$u_i(\alpha_6)$	$u_i(\alpha_7)$	$u_i(\alpha_8)$	$u_i(\alpha_9)$
1	1	3	4	5	8	14	16	18	23
2	10	2	15	6	8	22	31	30	32
3	14	2	22	13	15	27	42	38	48

I have not yet found a conceptual proof showing that no PMMS allocation exists that would not devolve into a longish, uninformative case distinction. Computationally, it is easy to verify by complete enumeration that no PMMS allocation exists, for example with the following Python code, which can also be found at <https://gist.github.com/pgöelz/e213cebb5ff6ee7ee00acd802246f88a>:

```
from itertools import product

def bundle_value(utils, allocation, agent, bundle):
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    """Calculate  $u_i(A_j)$  for agent  $i$  and bundle  $j$ ."""
    n = len(utils)
    m = len(allocation)
    return sum(utils[agent][j] for j in range(m) if allocation[j] == bundle)

def is_pmms(utils, allocation):
    """Check through exhaustive enumeration whether the allocation is PMMS for
    the given utilities.

    Represent an allocation as a vector of length  $m$ , where each entry gives
    the index (between 0 and  $n-1$ ) of the agent the good is assigned to.
    """
    n = len(utils)
    m = len(allocation)
    for agent in range(n):
        for bundle in range(n):
            if bundle == agent:
                continue
            ownvalue = bundle_value(utils, allocation, agent, agent)
            reallocationindices = [j for j in range(m) if allocation[j]
                                   in [agent, bundle]]
            for split in product([agent, bundle],
                                  repeat=len(reallocationindices)):
                newallocation = list(allocation)
                for good, towhom in zip(reallocationindices, split):
                    newallocation[good] = towhom
                if (ownvalue < bundle_value(utils, tuple(newallocation),
                                             agent, agent)
                    and ownvalue < bundle_value(utils, tuple(newallocation),
                                                  agent, bundle)):
                    return False # PMMS-violating split found
    return True

def test_pmms_counterexample(utils):
    """Test through exhaustive enumeration whether there really is no PMMS
    allocation for the given additive utilities.

    Represent utils as a list of  $n$  lists (one per agent), each inner list of
    length  $m$  containing the agent's values for the goods in order.
    """
    n = len(utils)
    assert n >= 1
    m = len(utils[0])
    assert all(len(agentutils) == m for agentutils in utils)

    for allocation in product(range(n), repeat=m):
        if is_pmms(utils, allocation):
            print("Not a counterexample to PMMS, PMMS allocation exists:",

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        allocation)
    return False
print("No PMMS allocation exists, valid counterexample:", utils)
return True

if __name__ == "__main__":
    candidate = [[1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 14, 16, 18, 23],
                 [10, 2, 15, 6, 8, 22, 31, 30, 32],
                 [14, 2, 22, 13, 15, 27, 42, 38, 48]]
    test_pmms_counterexample(candidate)

```

AI Usage

The text of this note and the above script for verifying the counterexample are entirely written by hand. But the counterexample was found by a large language model with a large degree of autonomy. I found an initial counterexample with $m = 12$ goods using OpenAI’s GPT-6 Astra model in ultra mode, with a prompt that simply asked to resolve the existence of PMMS allocations. I subsequently tried a number of parallel attempts at simplifying the instance with ChatGPT, integer linear programming, and manual inspection. ChatGPT produced the above 9-good instance. I will expand on this note shortly.

References

- [ABF+24] Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Federico Fusco, Philip Lazos, Stefano Leonardi, and Rebecca Reiffenhäuser. “Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness”. In: *Mathematics of Operations Research* 49.4 (2024), pp. 2425–2445.
- [CGM20] Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, and Kurt Mehlhorn. “EFX Exists for Three Agents”. In: *Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)*. 2020, pp. 1–19.
- [CKM+19] Ioannis Caragiannis, David Kurokawa, Hervé Moulin, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah, and Junxing Wang. “The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare”. In: *ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation* 7.3 (2019), pp. 1–32.